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Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

to adjudicate collectively all of the conflicting water rights claims on a
source of water, without being hindered by the United States'
invocation of its sovereign immunity." The Commonwealth asserted
that the Amendment of 1952 applied retroactively to proceedings
surrounding the 1942 and 1944 permits. The Amendment "allow[ed]
the United States to be joined as a defendant in any proceeding for
the adjudication or administration of water rights 'where it appears
that the United States is the owner of or is in the process of acquiring
water rights."' The United States asserted the court could not apply
the Amendment retroactively, nor had Congress intended to apply it
in such a way.
The court relied on Landgrafv. USI Film Products and E. Enters. v.
Apfel to determine whether the court could apply a statute or
amendment retroactively.
The general rule called for strict
interpretation and application according to the precise terms of such
legislation. "The natural extension of this maxim of interpretation was
that statutory waivers of sovereign immunity are not to be applied
retroactively." The specific rule of Landgraf required a court to
determine whether a piece of legislation "'attaches new legal
consequences"' to prior events. The court found that in the instant
case, application of the Amendment would impair the rights of the
Navy allowed by the 1944 permit and would impose additional duties
upon the Navy. As the retroactive application would have an effect on
the 1944 permit, the court resolved not to retroactively apply the
Amendment in this case.
Since the Commonwealth could not prove clear congressional
intent favoring the retroactive application of the Amendment, the
court held that the Amendment did not apply to the Navy's permits
held before 1952. The court granted declaratory relief, allowing the
United States to use its sovereign immunity to avoid local
administrative proceedings regarding the 1944 permit.
KatharineJEllison
Martin Marietta Materials Southwest, Ltd. v. St. Paul Guardian Ins.
Co., 145 F. Supp. 2d 794 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (holding a decrease in
downstream water was the natural and foreseeable result of diverting a
creek that could conceivably harm downstream users, and neither a
duty to defend nor indemnify existed on behalf of the insurer).
Martin Marietta Materials Southwest, Ltd. ("Marock") owned a
facility near Big Sandy Creek ("Creek"). St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co.
("St. Paul") provided Marock with primary general liability coverage.
Trinity Materials, Inc. ("Trinity"), located downstream of Marock and
holding senior water rights to the creek, alleged Marock diverted the
creek for construction purposes without a valid water permit and,
therefore, deprived Trinity of the water it needed to operate. Trinity
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sued Marock for negligence. Marock sought a declaratory judgment
maintaining St. Paul had a duty both to defend and to indemnify
Marock in the suit. Marock and St. Paul both moved for summary
judgment.
As the determinative issue in this case, the court looked to whether
Trinity's injuries resulted from an accident. The court agreed with
Trinity and found foreseeability, not intent, as the threshold at bar.
The court maintained Marock intentionally diverted the creek while
simultaneously lacking specific intent to cause injury. However, the
court did not deem the natural and predictable consequences of such
acts accidental. Thus, Trinity's injuries were not the result of an
accident.
Furthermore, Trinity argued a decrease in available downstream
water was a natural and foreseeable result of diverting the creek. The
court agreed and found the very presence of a water permit system
reflects the finite nature of water resources, such as this creek.
Therefore, although Marock may have lacked knowledge as to the
identity of the downstream users, a decrease in downstream water was
a natural and foreseeable result of diverting the creek, which harmed
downstream users.
In order to indemnify St. Paul, Marock argued Trinity's negligence
allegations proved the accidental nature of the harm. The court
disagreed, finding that the diversion was intentional, but not
negligent. Therefore, St. Paul did not have a duty to defend or
indemnify Marock. Finally, Marock argued it did not intend to inflict
harm on Trinity, however, the court reiterated it found foreseeability,
not intent, as the issue in this case.
Willow Arnold

STATE COURTS
ALABAMA
City of Dothan v. Eighty-Four West, Inc., No. 2991351, 20001 Ala. Civ.
App. LEXIS 313 (Ala. Civ. App. June 15, 2001) (holding the "common
enemy rule" entitles a property owner to construct a dam on his
property to fend off oncoming surface water).
The City of Dothan ("Dothan") appealed a trial court order that
found a landowner, Flowers, was authorized to construct a dam on his
property pursuant to the "common-enemy" rule. Flowers owned
property over which an easement ran to allow drainage of surface
water from his property through adjacent property. In 1997, Flowers
applied for a permit from Dothan to build an earthen dam on his
property to prevent surface water from an upper property not owned

